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A LEGAL NEWSLETTER 
FOR INDEPENDENT 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
PLAGIARISM AT PRINCETON: 
AN ACADEMIC JUDGMENT OR 
A DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE 
Over the past few years, litigation 
between students and the universities 
they attend has become a matter of 
course. Students have turned to the 
courts to protect their rights and to 
check administrative discretion. For 
better or for worse, universities are 
made more accountable to the rule of 
law. 
Yet, despite this alleged injection of 
legal norms into university life, courts 
have almost uniformly upheld academic 
and disciplinary dismissals of students. 
Underlying these decisions is a judicial 
presumption that the relationship 
between student and university is 
unique: 
Transcending that bare relation-
ship is the understanding that the 
student will abide by the reason-
able regulations both academic 
and disciplinary, that the student 
will meet the academic standards 
established by the faculty, and 
that the university on the success-
ful completion of studies will 
award the degree sought to the 
student. (Napolitano v. Princeton 
University, 1982.) 
The parameters of this quasi-associa-
tional, quasi-contractual relationship 
are the subject matter of a lawsuit 
involving Princeton University and 
Gabrielle Napolitano, a student whose 
diploma is being withheld for a year due 
to a finding by a university committee of 
a plagiarism violation. 
Factual Background 
Gabrielle Napolitano, an outstanding 
student at Princeton, was accused of 
plagiarising a term paper in a Spanish 
literature course during her senior year. 
The assignment was to write in Spanish 
a critical analysis of one of the works 
read for the course. Napolitano met 
with the professor to seek approval of 
her topic on the last day of classes 
before the Christmas recess. At this 
meeting, the professor suggested that 
Napolitano refer to a particular secon-
dary source, which was an interpreta-
tion of the work which Napolitano had 
selected as the subject for her term 
paper. The professor in that course 
alleged that Napolitano knowingly 
submitted a term paper which was 
nothing more than a mosaic of excerpts 
from this single secondary source. In 
support of this allegation, the professor 
pointed to thirty-seven places where 
Napolitano used the exact language of 
the secondary source without attribu-
tion. The professor also noted that 
Napolitano had signed a pledge 
attesting to the originality of her work. 
Counterbalancing this allegation of 
intentional deceit, Napolitano stressed 
the fact that the professor recom-
mended that she use the secondary 
source in question. Because of this, 
Napolitano felt that the professor 
would anticipate her heavy reliance on 
this source. Additionally, Napolitano 
claimed that it would be extremely 
unlikely that any student would 
intentionally plagiarize from a source 
with which the professor had already 
demonstrated her familiarity. Finally, 
Napolitano pointed to the fact that she 
had expressly cited the source in 
question on six occasions. 
Napolitano was found guilty ofplag-
iarism by the university's Faculty-Student Committee on 
Discipline. The committee voted to withhold N apoli-
tano's diploma for one year. Napolitano unsuccessfully 
appealed this decision to the president of the university. 
Napolitano then instituted an action against the univer-
sity. She claimed, among other things, that: (1) the Com-
mittee on Discipline was biased against her because she 
was limited in her use of character witnesses and was not 
permitted to cross-examine the professor; (2) the com-
mittee failed to follow its own procedures because it did 
not make the requisite finding of "specific intent to pass 
off the work of another's"; (3) she was improperly denied 
the right to outside legal counsel at her hearing; and (4) 
her punishment was unfair given both her excellent 
record and the supposedly educative nature of discipli-
nary punishments. 
The Napolitano case was first heard by the Mercer 
County Chancery Court. That court initially ordered that 
the university's Committee on Discipline rehear the case 
to determine whether Napolitano intentionally sought to 
deceive her professor. Upon rehearing, the Committee on 
Discipline affirmed its earlier ruling and the university's 
president denied Napolitano's appeal. The trial judge 
upheld the finding of intentional plagiarism. The judge 
also upheld the penalty imposed by the committee 
although he personally felt it too severe, because "to 
upset Princeton's decision I would have to find that 
Princeton could not in good faith have assessed the 
penalties .... " 
Ms. Napolitano appealed this decision to the Appel-
late Divison of the Superior Court of New Jersey. That 
court affirmed the trial court's decision on October 13, 
1982. Ms. Napolitano decided not to appeal that decision 
to the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
Academic Evaluations vs. Disciplinary 
Procedures: Varying Standards of Review 
Courts, for the most part, are unwilling to intervene in 
decisions by colleges and universities concerning grades, 
academic evaluations, or academic dismissals of 
students. On the other hand, courts will apply a stricter 
standard of review over matters of discipline. Discipli-
nary dismissals or suspensions are those based on vio-
lation of the college's behavioral norms or rules of 
conduct. The rationale behind this varying standard of 
review was stated in Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 1980: 
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Matters involving academic standards generally 
rest upon the subjective judgment of profes-
sional educators, courts are reluctant to impose 
the strictures of traditional legal rules. Though 
such matters are subject to judicial scrutiny, the 
issue reviewed in such a case is whether the insti-
tution has acted in good faith. 
Suspension or expulsion for causes unrelated to 
academic achievement, however, involve deter-
minations quite closely akin to the day-to-day 
work of the judiciary. Recognizing the present 
day importance of higher education to many, if 
not most, employment opportunities, the courts 
have, therefore, looked more closely at the 
actions of educational institutions in such 
matters. 
The Tedeschi case is exemplary of the court's willing-
ness to intervene in disciplinary matters. In Tedeschi, a 
student was suspended for disciplinary reasons without 
the benefit of a hearing as provided for in the college's 
rules. New York's highest court ordered that Tedeschi be 
reinstated, at least until she was dismissed according to 
appropriate university procedures. The court indicated 
that when a university has established a procedure, it 
must substantially observe that procedure. 
In stark contrast to Tedeschi, the New York Supreme 
Court refused to intervene in an academic matter in 
which a student was failed for a grade of 69. 7 when 70 was 
the passing grade for the course. The court claimed: 
This judicial reluctance to intervene encom-
passes controversies including academic stan-
dards. This policy of judicial restraint isfounded 
upon sound considerations of public policy. 
When an educational institution issues a 
diploma to one of its students, it is, in effect, 
certifying to society that the student possesses all 
of the knowledge and skills that are required by 
the chosen discipline. An educational institution 
is not required to confer a diploma before the 
student has demonstrated competence in 
accordance with the institution's academic stan-
darcls. (McIntosh v. Borough of Manhattan 
Community College, 1980.) 
In a similar vein, the First United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Lyons v. Salve Regina College, (1977) let 
stand a college dean's decision to disregard a recommen-
dation-as being merely advisory in nature-by a grade 
appeal committee and to deny Lyon's appeal of a failing 
grade. 
Plagiarism: An Academic or a 
Disciplinary Matter? 
There is no conclusive authority on whether plagiarism 
is an academic or a disciplinary matter. Plagiarism occurs 
in an academic setting and, indeed, relates to the essence 
of an academic degree. On the other hand, plagiarism has 
aspects of a behavioral norm; in other words, students 
shall not represent the works of another as their own. 
Princeton University defines plagiarism as: "The deli-
berate use of any outside source without proper acknowl-
edgement. Outside source means any work, published or 
unpublished, by any person other than the student." 
Princeton also requires its students' work to be original, 
as evidenced by the pledge that must accompany all sub-
missions. Apparently, professors at Princeton have great 
discretion in determining whether a student submitted 
nonoriginal work. This is borne out by the fact that a 
Princeton professor, who testified on behalf of Ms. 
Napolitano before the Committee on Discipline, argued 
that he would not have viewed the Napolitano paper as 
being plagiarized because she made reference to the 
secondary source in question. At the same time, Prince-
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ton's student handbook thoroughly delineates general 
requirements for the acknowledgment of academic work, 
including quotations, paraphrasing, the use of ideas and 
facts, and footnotes and bibliography. These careful 
delineations suggest that the boundaries of permissible 
and impermissible conduct ought to be fairly well known 
to both students and professors. 
Neither Princeton University nor Ms. Napolitano 
argued that plagiarism ought to be viewed as an academic 
offense. Yet the appellate court characterized it as such. 
For that court characterized the problem as "one involv-
ing academic standards and not a case of violation of 
rules of conduct." Consequently, that court held.that the 
university's actions ought to be scrutinized under the 
deferential academic decision-making standard. 
The Analytical Framework: Contract 
And Private Association Rationales 
Courts will generally limit their review of private 
university academic and disciplinary decision-making to 
a determination of whether a university abided by its own 
regulations. The basis of this analytical framework is a 
merger of the law of associations with the law of con-
tracts. 
There is little doubt as to the applicability of contract 
doctrine to the university-student relationship: 
The student comes to the academic community 
(the university) seeking to be educated in agiven 
discipline. The student pays a tuition which 
might, in some instances, represent a contrac-
tual consideration. The university undertakes to 
educate that student through its faculty and 
through the association of other students with 
that student and the faculty. (Napolitano, 1982) 
But the courts are unwilling to apply rigidly the law of 
contracts to the student-university relationship. In 
Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, (1975) the Tenth 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held the trial 
court in error for its strict application of commercial 
contract doctrine to the university's expUlsion of a 
graduate student for academic dishonesty. Similarly, 
Princeton stated in its brief before the appellate court: 
Education contracts are unique and should not 
be mechanistically construed, but should permit 
the university to exercise sufficient discretion to 
properly exercise its educational responsibility. 
This uniqueness derives primarily from the similarities 
between the relationship of a university to its student and 
the relationship of a private association to its members. 
This law, as recognized by the appellate court in 
Napolitano quoting from another New Jersey case, 
requires that: 
Courts ordinarily ought not to intrude upon 
areas of associational decision involving special-
ized knowledge. . . . Private associations must 
have considerable latitude in rule-making in 
order to accomplish their objectives and their 
private law generally is binding on those who 
wish to remain members. (Higgins v. American 
Society of Clinical Pathologists, 1968) 
Consequently, courts generally will not intervene in 
internal university decision-making. Instead, they will 
merely require the university to abide by its own proce-
dures. And if the matter at stake is an academic deter-
mination, the courts will even be deferential in their 
review of whether the university abided by its procedures. 
Legal Issues Raised in Napolitano 
In challenging the university's action, Ms. Napolitano 
raised a number oflegal issues. Where does the decision-
making authority lie? Is a student at an independent 
university entitled to be represented by counsel at univer-
sity proceedings? Is the university's plagiarism 
determination accurate? Is the punishment appropriate? 
Ms. Napolitano alleged that the trial court-not the 
University Committee on Discipline-should have deter-
mined whether she intentionally' sought to pass off the 
work of another as her own. Ms. Napolitano asked the 
court to alter its view of the allegedly special quasi-
contractual, quasi-associational relationship between a 
university and its students and argued that courts ought 
to recognize that "higher education at private univer-
sities is big business" and thus be willing to engage in 
greater oversight of university affairs. 
The appellate court rejected this argument. It held that 
the student-university relationship is unique: "We must 
give substantial deference to the importance of institu-
tional integrity and independence." Consequently, the 
appellate court held that decision-making authority in 
this matter was appropriately lodged with the university'S 
Committee on Discipline. 
This conclusion was buttressed by court decisions, 
such as Slaughter and Tedeschi, which recognized that a 
court could do no more than require a university to abide 
by its own procedures. In Slaughter, the court went so far 
as to claim that: 
School discipline problems must first be re-
solved in the school and by its constituted 
authorities. This is a function of the educational 
process and has always been considered a basic 
element. The student places himself in the school 
community and traditionally those with imme-
diate supervision plus one or more in an admin-
istrative position, or combined position, enforce 
the rules of discipline. This has to be the starting 
place at least. 
Ms. Napolitano alleged that her hearing before the 
university'S Committee on Discipline was necessarily 
biased against her because she was not permitted to have 
outside counsel represent her. In support of this position, 
Napolitano pointed to Ryan v. Hofstra University, 
(1971) a case in which New York's Supreme Court 
ordered the reinstatement of a student expelled for dis-
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ciplinary reasons because Hofstra's policy only permitted 
use of counsel employed by the university. In Ryan, the 
court stated: 
The university's interest in limiting counsel is 
only administrative and not clear . ... The only 
colorable administration interests in limiting 
counsel can be the fear of publicity harmful to it 
or the student, undue stress on legal technicality, 
or overly extensive attack on it by a lawyer 
unfeeling for the administration's problems. 
These are not nearly justification to deny free 
choice of counsel to a student literally fighting 
for his academic life. 
Countering Ryan, Princeton pointed to the fact that at an 
independent institution a student was not entitled to 
counsel for each academic or disciplinary dismissal. 
Furthermore, it pointed out that in Gabrilowitz v. 
Newman, (1978) the United States First Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that even a state university student did not 
have a right to counsel during a disciplinary procedure 
unless there was related criminal charges pending against 
the student. In Gabrilowitz. the court recognized that 
"most courts have declined to grant students the right to 
counsel in disciplinary proceedings," because "academic 
institutions have a significant interest In tile promulga-
tion of procedures for the resolution of student discipli-
nary problems." 
The trial and appellate courts in Napolitano rejected 
the ''right to counsel" allegation. For both courts, judicial 
intervention on this matter was precluded because of the 
university's authority to formulate its own substantive 
rules of conduct and to specify the procedural rights of 
students accused of violations of a rule. Independent 
institutions have not been required to allow counsel 
unless their own rules permit this type of representation. 
The issue of whether plagiarism is an academic or a 
disciplinary matter is significant in determining whether 
a court should upset a plagiarism conviction. Ms. 
Napolitano claimed that plagiarism is strictly a discipli-
nary matter and thus the courts were required to review 
carefully her conviction. The appellate court, however, 
applied a deferential standard of review by holding that 
plagiarism is an academic judgment. 
Ms. Napolitano alleged that her punishment was far 
too severe considering her past record, the nature of the 
alleged plagiarism, and the history of past treatment of 
students with similar offenses and backgrounds. As was 
the case with the plagiarism determination, the court 
refused to intervene. The trialjudge, despite his personal 
disagreement with the university's action, held that: 
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The proper role of a court is to permit organiza-
tions to govern their own affairs unless the 
Court's intrusion is warranted by conduct so 
egregious as to constitute a breach of the agree-
ment between the parties. . .. To upset Prince-
ton's decision I would have to find that Prince-
ton could not in good faith have assessed the 
penalties it did against plaintiff, but I cannot do 
so, considering my understanding of the proper 
role of the courts. 
The appellate court affirmed this determination. On this 
issue, the weight of precedent clearly speaks in favor of 
judicial deference to university disciplinary discretion. 
The Significance of N apoiitano 
The most troubling aspects of the Napolitano case are 
not easily amenable to satisfactory judicial resolution; 
namely, what constitutes plagiarism and what sorts of 
penalties should be imposed in plagiarism cases. Because 
of this, the courts are likely to defer to the rule-making 
authority of colleges and universities. College and univer-
sity administrators ought to delineate clearly what is 
plagiarism and what are the penalties so that students are 
aware of the standards and college and university offi-
cials abide by them. Otherwise, students will properly sue 
colleges and universities for breaching their own pro-
cedures. 
-Neal Devins 
-Kent M. Weeks 
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